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DCS Distributed Control System.  A term used to describe a subset of control systems. 
Digital A description of data represented as a sequence of discrete symbols from a finite set, 
such as "on/off". 
Digital/Analog 
Converter 
A hardware device that transforms analog data to a binary representation. 
DNP3 Distributed Network Protocol Version 3.3.  Standard describing communications in a 
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Ethernet A networking technology for local area computer networks. 
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Sensors or actuators that contain embedded processing functionality to perform complex 
sensing and actuating tasks. 
Interface A point at which independent systems interact or exchange information. 
IPX Internetwork Packet Exchange, a networking protocol used by the Novell NetWare 
operating systems. 
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its name from the ladder-like appearance of a program.  The "rungs" of the program 
contain program instructions.  
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Modbus Standard describing communications in a control system 
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Non-Volatile 
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Computer storage that is not lost when the power is turned off 
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PLC Programmable Logic Controller. A Remote Terminal Unit that employs ladder logic 
programming. 
Point to Point Communications between two components directly connected to each other. 
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Sensors Field Instrumentation devices used to detect a change in a process. 
Serial Port A hardware interface that allows for transmission of data one bit at a time. 
TCP/IP Transport Control Protocol/Internet Protocol.  A suite of protocols for network 
communications. 
UCA Utility Communications Architecture standard describing communications in a control 
system 
Volatile Memory Computer storage that is lost when the power is turned off 
Voltage Electromotive force or potential difference, usually expressed in volts. 
X.25 An International Telecommunications Union (ITU) standard describing communications 
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1 
I. INTRODUCTION  
While Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) systems have been 
employed to monitor and control industrial facilities for decades, the designs of these 
systems, their components, and the communications protocols are primarily proprietary.  
There has been a trend of late to define standard interfaces and communications 
protocols, primarily driven by the growth of the Internet and consolidation of utility 
companies and industries.  These efforts are a means of providing cross-vendor 
compatibility and modularity: since replacing an existing SCADA network is an 
expensive proposition, integrating existing systems is the most economical approach. 
Further, communications between nodes in a SCADA system has been, until 
recently, over closed networks.  With the advent of the Internet, many SCADA 
monitoring and control networks have been connected, at some level, to open networks, 
thereby inheriting all the problems and concerns associated with nodes on the Internet.   
Because of these two trends, there are concerns about the security and stability of 
SCADA systems, especially since the September 11, 2001 attacks.  Recent failures of 
critical infrastructure SCADA systems, such as the North East blackout in August 2003, 
highlight these concerns.  Most of our nation's infrastructure is controlled in one way or 
another by a SCADA system, and the Department of Defense (DoD) relies heavily on the 
existing commercial infrastructure for its operations.  To ensure continued operations in 
times of crisis, the SCADA systems on which the DoD depends must be secured.   
An abstract generic framework for defining and understanding SCADA systems is 
needed as a first step toward securing them.   
SCADA systems are not designed with security in mind; rather the priority for 
developers has been reliability, availability, and speed. This does not mean they cannot 
be secured, however.  If we can understand a particular system's features, functions and 
capabilities, we can address its limitations.  A generic abstract framework provides a tool 
to understand the system's features, functions and capabilities, and how components in 
the system relate and interface with each other.  With that information about the system, 
we can begin the process of securing it. 
2 
This thesis begins with an examination of control systems, and SCADA systems 
in particular.  It describes the different components in a SCADA system and the variety 
of open communications protocols that have been defined.  The thesis then refines a 
three-tiered model and ultimately provides a matrix approach to describing and defining 
the features, functions and capabilities of a SCADA system.  
Several examples illustrating how to apply the matrix approach to describing and 
defining SCADA systems are provided, using the Naval Postgraduate School's SCADA 
Technology Testing Lab Demonstration Model (NPS SCADA Lab).  The NPS SCADA 
Lab was developed as part of this thesis using industry standard hardware from Allen-
Bradley and software from Rockwell Automation, and provides several working systems 
to simulate real-world applications of SCADA technology. The NPS SCADA Lab 
configuration is described in the thesis.   
3 
II. BACKGROUND 
A. OVERVIEW OF CONTROL SYSTEMS 
The use of automation in manufacturing and industrial processes presupposes a 
mechanism for the operator to control and monitor physical functions in real time.  As 
complexity of these processes increases, the ability for remote control and monitoring 
from a central location provides increased labor and cost efficiency and offers 
opportunities to increase the economies of scale.  Further, aggregation of feedback data 
provides supervisors and management personnel the ability to monitor trends, forecast 
requirements, and optimize procedures.   A Control System is the generic term for the 
hardware, software, and procedures used to control and monitor these processes, and to 
manage the accumulated data for later study. 
A typical control system consists of one or more remote terminal units (RTU) 
connected to a variety of sensors and actuators, and relaying information to a master 














Figure 1 Typical Control System. 
 
The design and function of the RTUs, sensors, actuators, and master station, as 
well as the means of communication between components, are implementation details 
4 
that will vary depending on the manufacturing or industrial process being controlled.  A 
distributed control system may have multiple master stations or layers of master stations.  
1. Sensors and Actuators 
The philosophy behind control systems can be summed up by the phrase "If you 
can measure it, you can control it." [1]   Sensors perform measurement, and actuators 
perform control.    
Sensors measure level, pressure, flow, current, voltage, temperature, a binary 
status ("on" or "off"), or react to some other external stimulus.  The acquired data can be 
either analog (continuously variable values, usually proportional to the measured 
quantity) or digital (sequence of discrete values from a finite set).  The results of the 
measurements are transmitted via a communications link to the RTU in either a raw form 
or manipulated by a processor found within the sensor itself before transmission to the 
RTU.  The communications link itself may be analog or digital.  
Actuators open or close valves, regulate pumps, open or close relays, trip circuit 
breakers, or perform other mechanical functions.  The command passed to an actuator 
can be either analog or digital, and the communications link may be either analog or 
digital. 
2.  Remote Terminal Units 
A Remote Terminal Unit (RTU) is a standalone unit used to monitor and control 
sensors and actuators at a remote location, and to transmit data and control signals to a 
central master monitoring station.  Depending on the sophistication of the microcontroller 
in the RTU, it can be configured to act as a relay station for other RTUs which cannot 
communicate directly with a master station, or  the microcontroller can communicate on a 
peer-to-peer basis with other RTUs.  RTUs are generally remotely programmable, 
although many can also be programmed directly from a panel on the RTU. 
Small size RTUs generally have less than 20 analog or digital inputs and medium 
size RTUs typically have 100 digital and up to 40 analog inputs, while an RTU with 
greater than 100 digital or 40 analog inputs is considered large.  Many RTUs are modular 
and thus expandable, and several RTUs can be logically combined as one, depending on 
the model and manufacturer. [2] 
5 
Figure 2 shows a typical RTU. A RTU consists of a power supply, a central 
processing unit (CPU), memory (both volatile and non-volatile), and a series of inputs 
and outputs.  The CPU controls communications with the sensors and actuators through 
the inputs and outputs, and with the master station through a serial port, an Ethernet port, 
or some other interface.  A programming interface can also be connected to any of these 
interfaces.  The Central Bus serves as the conduit for communications between the 
components of the RTU. 
Figure 2 Typical RTU Configuration (After Ref. [2]). 
 
a. Programmable Logic Controllers 
Advances in CPUs and the programming capabilities of RTUs have 
allowed for more sophisticated monitoring and control.  Applications that had previously 
been programmed at the central master station can now be programmed at the RTU. 
These modern RTUs typically use a ladder-logic approach to programming due to its 
similarity to standard electrical circuits--the majority of RTU programmers are engineers, 
not computer programmers.  A RTU that employs this ladder logic programming is called 
a Programmable Logic Controller (PLC).  PLCs are quickly becoming the standard in 
control systems. 
6 
Ladder-logic development environments mimic electrical circuits by 
drawing two vertical lines representing power, with the horizontal "rungs" representing 
the logic required to "close" a circuit and thus send a signal to an actuator.  Each "rung" is 
a step in a sequential program.  [2] (Appendix B contains a detailed explanation of the 
ladder logic programming used in the SLC-505 controller for the demonstration 
laboratory.) 
b. Analog Input and Output Modules 
The configuration of sensors and actuators determines the quantity and 
type of inputs and outputs on a PLC or RTU; depending on the model and manufacturer, 
modules can be designed solely for input, output, digital, analog, or any combination.   
An analog input module has a number of interfaces, usually binding posts 
or screw posts, which are wired directly to a number of sensors.  A multiplexer in the 
module samples each of the analog interfaces in turn and passes the reading to an 
Analog/Digital (A/D) converter to convert the analog signals to digital representations, 
usually 8 or 12 bits, for transmission to the CPU over the central bus.  Typical analog 
input modules have 8, 16, or 32 inputs. 
Analog output modules work in reverse: they take digital values from the 
CPU and convert them to analog representations, which are then sent to the actuators.  An 
output module usually has 8, 16 or 32 output binding or screw posts, and typically offers 
8 or 12 bits of resolution. [2] 
c. Digital Input and Output Modules 
Digital input modules typically are used to indicate status and alarm 
signals.  A number of binding or screw posts (usually 8, 16 or 32) receive a signal from 
the sensor to indicate either an "open" or "closed" circuit, and can usually be configured 
to read a variety of voltages or currents.  Depending on the manufacturer, modules also 
have an LED to indicate the current value of the signal. 
A specialized digital input module is used for counting pulses of voltage 
or current, rather than for strictly indicating "open" or "closed."  This functionality, 
however, can also be implemented using standard input modules and functions found in 
the ladder-logic programming language of the PLC. 
7 
Digital output modules drive a voltage to a binding or screw post, and 
typically have an LED to indicate the current value of the signal. [2] 
d. Communications interfaces 
Modern RTUs and PLCs offer a wide variety of communications means, 
either built in directly or through a module.  The following list represents a variety of 
transmission methods supported: 
• RS-232/RS-442/RS-485 
• Dialup telephone lines 






• Radio (VHF, UHF, etc) [2] 
 
Each of these methods could be used to communicate with the master 
station, other PLCs or RTUs, the programming station, or operator consoles.  Chapter II, 
Section D discusses the variety of communications protocols available and the media for 
each.   
3. Master Stations 
Master stations have two main functions:  
• Periodically obtain data from RTUs/PLCs (and other master or sub-master 
stations 
• Control remote devices through the operator station [3] 
Master stations consist of one or more personal computers (PC), which, although 
they can function in a multi-purpose mode (email, word processing, etc), are configured 
to be dedicated to master station duties.  These duties include trending, alarm handling, 
logging and archiving, report generation, and facilitation of automation.  These duties 
may be distributed across multiple PCs, either standalone or networked.  
8 
A master station may communicate to one RTU via a serial, Ethernet, wireless, 
radio, or other means.  It could also communicate to a number of RTUs which are 
networked together, or it could communicate with one RTU that is in a peer-to-peer 
relationship with other RTUs.  A master station may also aggregate data from any 
number of sub-master stations.  The design of the master stations is situationally 
dependant. 
 
B. SUPERVISORY CONTROL AND DATA ACQUISITION 
Control systems are used at all levels of manufacturing and industrial processing.  
A manufacturing plant that employs robotic arms will have a control system to direct 
robotic arms and conveyor belts on the shop floor.  It may use that same system for 
packaging the finished product and tracking inventory.  It may also use a control system 
to monitor its distribution network.  A chemical company will use control systems to 
monitor tank levels and to ensure that ingredients are mixed in the proper proportions.  A 
Las Vegas casino will use control systems to direct the spray from water fountains in 
coordination with the lights and music.  Control systems are also used in the drilling and 
refining of oil and natural gas.  [9]  They are used in the distribution of water and 
electricity by utility companies, and in the collection of waste water and sewage.  [10] 
Virtually every sector of the economy employs control systems at all levels.   
Because of the ubiquitous nature of control systems, a variety of terms have 
originated to describe them: process control systems, distributed control systems, 
automation control systems, industrial control systems, and supervisory control and data 
acquisition systems. All the terms refer in the broadest sense to control systems as 
defined above.  Some focus on manufacturing and the actions that take place on the 
factory floor, and each industry sector will define its own terms.  [2, 4, 5, 6] 
The term "supervisory control and data acquisition" (SCADA), however, is 
generally accepted to mean the systems that control the distribution of critical 
infrastructure public utilities (water, sewer, electricity, and oil and gas). [7] 1 Confusion 
                                                 
1 ANSI C37.1 defines "Supervisory Systems" as "all control, indicating, and associated telemetry 
equipments at the master station, and all of the complementary devices at the remote station, or stations."  
This definition further confuses the issue, because it appears to define control systems in general, and not 
SCADA systems. [8] 
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arises, however, because while control systems are actively used in other critical 
infrastructure sectors (transportation, chemicals), the term SCADA is not used to describe 
them.  Other critical systems, such as those aboard Navy ships, are referred to as SCADA 
systems even though they do not meet the generally accepted definition of the term. 
The General Accounting Office has reduced this confusion by using the generic 
term "Control Systems" and describing two types of control systems: Distributed Control 
Systems (DCS) and SCADA: 
[DCS] typically are used within a single processing or generating plant or 
over a small geographic area.  [SCADA] systems typically are used for 
large, geographically dispersed distribution operations.  A utility company 
may use DCS to generate power and a SCADA system to distribute it. [4] 
This thesis will adapt the GAO approach, with one modification: the term 
SCADA will not be limited to describing "large, geographically dispersed" systems, but 
rather will include any distribution system, whether "large" or not; "geographically 
dispersed" or not.  The key word in the definition is "distribution."  
This modification will allow the inclusion of Navy ship-to-shore utility control 
systems in our definition. Shipboard control systems are more properly defined as DCS 
unless they are involved in managing the distribution of some commodity.  Nevertheless, 
the models presented in Section III make little or no distinction between distribution 
systems and non-distribution systems. 
 
C. PROTOCOLS AND STANDARDS 
In SCADA Systems, the three major categories of protocols involve the 
specifications for design and manufacture of sensors and actuators, specifications for 
RTUs, and the specifications for communications between components of a control 
system.   
The specifications for design and manufacture of sensors and actuators are 
concerned with the engineering requirements for specific industrial components such as 
valves and measurement equipment, and also dictate safety tolerances, measurement 
thresholds, and environmental considerations. They are typically issued by the 
International Standards Organization (ISO) or the International Electrotechnical 
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Commission (IEC).  A thorough examination of these standards is beyond the scope of 
this thesis. 
1. RTU Design and Programming Standards 
The prevalent standard for industrial control RTU design and programming is the 
IEC 61131 series, developed by the two IEC working groups, the Industrial Process 
Measurement And Control group and the IT Applications In Industry group.  It is a series 
of seven publications that serve to standardize the programming languages, instruction 
sets, and concepts used in industrial control devices such as RTUs and PLCs.  Table 1 
briefly describes the volumes in the standard.  
 
Table 1 IEC Standard 61131 Description [11][12] 
Standard Description 
IEC 61131-1 General Information 
IEC 61131-2 Specifies requirements and related tests for PLCs and associated peripherals.  
Establishes definitions and identifies principal characteristics. Specifies the minimum 
requirements for functional, electrical, mechanical, environmental and construction 
characteristics, service conditions, safety, Electromagnetic Compatibility (EMC), user 
programming and testing. 
IEC 61131-3 Specifies syntax and semantics of programming languages for programmable 
controllers 
IEC 61131-4 Technical Report.  Provides guidelines addressing the application PLCs and their 
integration into automated systems.  
IEC 61131-5 Specifies communications aspects of a PLC.  Specifies behavior of the PLC as it 
provides services on behalf of other devices and the services the PLC application 
program can request from other devices.  Specified independent of the particular 
communication subsystem. 
IEC 61131-6 Reserved for future use 
IEC 61131-7 Specifies a means to integrate fuzzy control applications in the PLC languages as 
defined in Part 3. 
IEC 61131-8 Technical report addressing the programming of PLCs using the PLC languages 
defined in  Part 3 
 
2. Communications Protocols 
a. IEC 60870 
There are two major protocol descriptions for SCADA component 
communications, designed specifically for the purpose of process control applications.  
The first is IEC 60870, and is described in Table 2.  IEC 60870 was defined primarily for 
the telecommunications of electrical system and control information and its data 
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structures are geared to that application.  It is the favored standard in the United States for 
electrical power grid SCADA systems, but is not as popular in Europe. 
 
Table 2 IEC Standard 60870 [13] 
Standard Description 
IEC 60870-1 General Considerations 
IEC 60870-2 Operating Conditions 
IEC 60870-3 Interfaces - electrical characteristics 
IEC 60870-4 Performance Requirements 
IEC 60870-5 Transmission Protocols 
IEC 60870-6 Telecontrol protocols compatible with ISO standards and ITU-T recommendations 
 
Of particular importance is Part 5 which redefines the 7-layer OSI 
Reference Model (ISO 7498) to fit a SCADA environment.  IEC 60870-5 and four 
companion standards define physical, link and application layers, as well as a "user 
process" above the application layer for non-networked (point-to-point) applications.  It 
also defines a five layer (plus user process) model for networked applications, adding a 
network and transport layer.  These standards are IEC 60870-5-101 and -104 
respectively. [13] 
Appendix A describes the implementation of the IEC 60870 standards in 
detail, including the structure of frames and messages. 
b. DNP3 
The second protocol specifically designed for SCADA communications is 
the Distributed Network protocol Version 3 (DNP3).  Also created for the electrical 
industry, it has been adapted by other industry sectors and is the leading protocol 
employed in Europe for most SCADA applications.  It enjoys a wide adoption in the 
United States and South America for all industries except the electrical power industry.  
It also provides a robust compliance certification framework, allowing hardware and 
software vendors to easily adapt their equipment. 
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DNP3 defines four layers, physical, data link, pseudo-transport, and 
application.  It is less restrictive than IEC 60870 and thus allows for expandability 
beyond the electrical industry.  [13]  Details of the standard are found in Appendix A. 
c. HDLC 
Several other SCADA standards exist, primarily High Level Data Link 
Control (HDLC) and Modbus.  HDLC, defined by ISO for point-to-point and multi-point 
links, is also known as Synchronous Data Link Control (SDLC) and Advanced Data 
Communication Control Procedure (ADCCP).  It is a bit-based protocol, the precursor to 
Ethernet, and is rapidly being replaced by DNP3, Industrial Ethernet2, and TCP/IP.  [14] 
d. Modbus 
Modbus is a relatively slow protocol that does not define interfaces, thus 
allowing users to choose between EIA-232, EIA-422, EIA-485 or 20mA current loop.  
While slow, it is widely accepted and has become a de-facto standard--a recent survey 
indicated that 40% of industrial communication applications use Modbus. [14] 
Details of both HDLC and Modbus can be found in Appendix A. 
e. Profibus 
Profibus is a German standard that defines three types: Field Message 
Specification (FMS) for use in general data acquisition systems, Decentralized 
Peripherals (DP) for use when fast communication is required, and Process Automation 
(PA) for use when highly reliable and safe communication is required.  It defines three 
layers: physical, data link and application. [15] 
f. Foundation Fieldbus 
Foundation Fieldbus is an extension to the 4-20mA standard to take 
advantage of digital technologies.  It defines 3+1 layers (physical, data link, application, 
and user).  [15] 
g. UCA 
The Utility Communications Architecture (UCA) is a new initiative from 
the Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI) designed for the electrical industry.  It is 
more than just a protocol definition; it is a comprehensive set of standards designed to 
                                                 
2 Industrial Ethernet is a term for proprietary implementations of TCP/IP or other protocols over 
standard IEEE 802.3 or proprietary Ethernet.  One example is Ethernet/IP (Industrial Protocol) [17, 18].  
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allow "plug and play" integration into systems, allowing manufacturers to design off-the-
shelf compliant devices.  IEEE assumed the UCA standards process in 1999 and has 
developed extensions for the water industry.  Other industries are also examining UCA 
for suitability.  [16] 





























III. ARCHITECTURAL ANALYSIS 
Although many manufacturers and standards exist for Supervisory Control and 
Data Acquisition (SCADA) systems, some features are common to all systems.  This 
chapter will review some of those previously described features and provide a framework 
for better understanding the characteristics of SCADA systems that can be applied to any 
system.  Understanding a system is the first step to securing it from compromise. 
 
A. TYPICAL THREE-LEVEL SCADA SYSTEM 
 
1. Introduction 
As noted in Chapter II, a control system aids in automating manufacturing and 
industrial processes, providing a mechanism for an operator to control and monitor 
physical functions (known as processes) either locally or remotely, and for supervisors 
and management to aggregate feedback data to monitor trends, forecast requirements, and 
optimize procedures.    
A typical control system consists of one or more remote terminals connected to a 
variety of sensors and actuators, and relaying information to one or more master stations.  
A Remote Terminal Unit (RTU) is a standalone unit used to monitor and control sensors 
and actuators, and to transmit data and control signals to a central master monitoring 
station.  Sensors and actuators are specialized hardware and software components that 
elicit information about the current status of or provide a means for influencing the 
process.  The Master Station periodically obtains data from the RTU and provides an 
interface for control of remote devices.   
Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) is the term commonly 
applied to control systems involved in the distribution of a commodity.  Figure 3, 
reproduced from Chapter II, illustrates a generic three tiered-approach to SCADA control 
system design incorporating the three main components described above. 
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Figure 3 Three-levels of a typical SCADA system. 
 
In addition to the Master Station, RTUs, and sensors and actuators, two additional 
influences can be added to the model as illustrated in Figure 4.  In any organization, 
business systems dictate policy and procedures relevant to the control and monitoring of 
the process; conceptually, these reside above the Master Station.  Similarly, the sensors 
and actuators directly act upon the physical objects we have been calling the "process."  
An in-depth examination of the Business System and Process Regulation layers is beyond 





Figure 4 The three-layer model with the addition of business systems above and 
process regulation below.  
 
2. Business Systems 
A typical organization will generate policies and procedures that define the 
process that must be monitored and controlled, allocate resources to it, and dictate how 
collected data will be distributed and audited.  A management information system (MIS) 
may facilitate access to the data supplied by the process, and can be used for forecasting, 
trending and optimization. Figure 5 illustrates some components of a Business System 
that will affect a SCADA implementation. 
Policies and procedures at all layers within the Business System affect the design 
and operation of the SCADA system.  For example, an enterprise level policy requiring 
access to the real-time status of a process for high-level decision making may affect the 
type of protection measures implemented at the Master Station, due to the integration of 
the control system communications network with the organization's business network.  
Similarly, a policy requiring compliance with health and safety regulations may require 
monitoring a process that does not directly impact operations and which would not 
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otherwise be monitored.  In general, a thorough examination of all policies and 
procedures in an organization is required to understand or design a SCADA system; since 
these business systems vary widely from organization to organization, the SCADA 
system design is tailored to the specific organization's policies and procedures. 
 
 
Figure 5 Business Systems define the overall policy and rules that are implemented in 




3.  Process Regulation 
Processes are a logical representation of the actions, changes, or functions 
bringing about a result on a physical object.  Processes may have inputs and outputs, and 
be affected by external environmental disturbances.  As shown in Figure 6, a SCADA 
system is designed to monitor and affect these processes via a control loop, and report 
back the consequences of the external stimulus on a process.  
For example, one typical process would involve regulating the flow of JP5 fuel to 
a gas turbine engine.  An operator (whether human or automated) determines the volume 
of fuel destined for the engine and instructs the system to open or close the valve as 
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required.  The SCADA system's actuator, based on parameters transmitted to it by the 
RTU, directly controls the valve to open or close.  The SCADA system's sensor will 
concurrently monitor the pressure in the fuel line, providing immediate feedback to the 
operator through the RTU.  The operator has immediate awareness of the fuel line 
pressure, and can compensate the valve's settings to achieve the desired equilibrium.  The 
sensor will also immediately perceive a rapid drop in line pressure, indicating perhaps a 
break in the fuel line.  Since, in practice, there are innumerable processes, each tailored to 
the implementation, this thesis does not address processes themselves, except to describe 
the commonalities of "sensing" and "actuating." 
 
Figure 6 Process Regulation describes the effect the SCADA system's components 
have on a physical object.  (After Ref. [20]) 
 
B. REFINEMENT OF THE THREE LAYER MODEL 
 
We can abstract the rather specific terms we have been using in our model so far 
by defining the various SCADA components by function.  The Master Station exhibits 
properties of supervisory control.  The Remote Terminal Units, responding to the 
supervisor, manipulate the process. The sensors and actuators, meanwhile, act on the 
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hardware components to carry out the specifics as directed by the process controller.  A 
logical layering resulting from the functional breakdown, as shown in Figure 7, allows an 
abstraction that can be applied to systems of varying complexity and size and broadens 
our ability to examine requirements of each layer.  The Supervisory Control layer, the 












Figure 7 The SCADA system's three levels separated into a functional representation. 
(After Ref. [21])  
 
 
1. Supervisory Control 
The Supervisory Control layer is the primary zone of control for the SCADA 
system.  Its primary functions are to: 
• Implement policy received from the Business System.  The Supervisory 
Control layer provides the interface for implementing business policy 
against the process, defining the actions the operator (whether human or 
automated) must take. 
• Manage the operational components of the SCADA system.  The 
Supervisory Control layer provides the interface for the configuration, 
management, programming and maintenance of the process control and 
field instrumentation components. 
• Provide access to the process data for archiving and analysis. The 
Supervisory Control layer accepts process data (feedback) from the lower 
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levels and makes that data available to the Business System for its 
purposes.   
Components on this level include the operator's console for day to day operations, 
and the programming console for programming, configuration, management and 
maintenance. 
2. Process Control 
The Process Control layer is the primary zone of operation for the SCADA 
system.  Its primary functions are to: 
• Receive directives from the Supervisory Control layer.  The Process 
Control layer applies logic rules dictated by policy to the directive, 
formats it for transmission to the field instrumentation units, and transmits 
it.   
• Receive feedback data from the Field Instrumentation layer.  The Process 
Control layer applies logic rules to the data, determines initial actions 
based on policy, formats data for transmission to the Supervisory Control 
layer, and transmits it. 
• Act on feedback data autonomously.  The Process Control layer receives 
feedback from Field Instrumentation units, applies pre-programmed 
policy-based logic rules to the data, determines actions required, and 
transmits directives back to Field Instrumentation units. 
• Manage day to day operations.  The Process Control layer monitors the 
health of Field Instrumentation units and reports anomalies to the 
Supervisory Control layer. 
Components at this layer include RTUs, Programmable Logic Controllers (PLC), 
and intelligent sensors and actuators. 
3. Field Instrumentation Control 
The Field Instrumentation layer is the primary zone of implementation for the 
SCADA system.  Its functions are to:  
• Receive instructions from the Process Control.  The Field Instrumentation 
layer continuously monitors for Process Control layer directives and 
carries the directives out against the process.   
• Monitor the process for changes.  The Field Instrumentation layer 
continuously monitors the process components for changes and transmits 
those changes to the Process Control layer.   
Components at this layer include sensors (such as valve flow meters or voltage 
meters), and actuators (such as valve flow regulators and voltage regulators).  Intelligent 
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sensors and actuators combine capabilities of both Field Instrumentation Control and 
Process Control components. 
4. Boundaries 
It is likely that different SCADA components will be segregated into logical 
functional or geographic boundaries that don't necessarily parallel security boundaries, as 
shown in Figure 8.  The decision on defining boundaries is arbitrary and is largely 
dependant on the specific implementation.  
 
 
Figure 8 A boundary will normally be defined for components of a SCADA system 
with similar functional or geographic characteristics. 
 
The problem of defining boundaries and synchronizing policies between 
boundaries is well known, and work continues on addressing this problem.  The example 
in Figure 9 shows how a complex system consisting of a variety of boundaries can make 
assessment difficult.  There are currently no effective methods for systematically defining 
or describing boundaries, nor for partitioning or assigning individual functions to specific 
boundaries.  Until an effective method is described, explicit attention and care must be 




Figure 9 A complex SCADA system can define multiple boundaries among many 
layers, making evaluation difficult. 
 
C. OPERATIONAL AND MANAGEMENT FUNCTIONS OF THE THREE 
LAYERS  
 
In the functional decomposition outlined above, each layer is assigned different 
responsibilities to perform; consequently, each layer is also managed differently.  In 
evaluating SCADA systems for security, the distinction between management and 
operation plays a crucial role.  SCADA systems by their nature, are designed for 
availability and data integrity, not confidentiality or authentication, and can reliably 
operate undisturbed for months or years with no human interaction or involvement.  Due 
to the independent and heavily hardware-oriented nature of SCADA systems, security 
procedures used in traditional computing systems-such as forced password changes after 
a set period or routine account auditing by administrators-do not apply to SCADA 
components.  An active management plan thus becomes a necessary requirement in 
developing a SCADA system.  A separation of the operational aspects of a system from 
the management aspects ensures that both developers and policy makers address the 
unique nature of the systems.  While the system may operate reliably on its own, it must 
still be actively managed as part of an ongoing plan to ensure correct and complete 
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implementation of security policy.  Thoroughly examining both allows for a more 
comprehensive assessment of a system. 
Figure 10 describes a very generic system in terms of operational and managerial 
functions.  The operational functions and management functions can correlate with each 
other, but each can also independently identify requirements that need to be addressed.  
For example, a critical shipboard process may require that the RTU employ the shipboard 
local area network (LAN) to communicate with the Master Control station.  In this 
scenario, the management functions will assess the security implications of exposing the 
SCADA traffic to the shipboard LAN.  The operational functions will assess the impact 
on responsiveness and availability of a critical time sensitive system that shares network 










Periodically obtain data from RTU or 
other master stations.
Control remote devices through the 
operator station.
Management:
Define data collection requirements
Define control rules
Hardware and communications 
configuration
Operation:
Monitor sensors and control actuators
Assess data and perform error 
checking
Transmit data and control signals
Management:
Configure sensor and actuator 
hardware
Define communications protocols
Define data collection rules
Operation:
Measure or control process or device
Perform initial assessment of data
Management:
Determine process or device to 
monitor or control and select 
appropriate sensor or actuator




Figure 10 Each of the three layers has unique operational functions, and each is 
managed differently.  
 
 
D. OPERATIONAL AND MANAGEMENT FUNCTION REFINEMENT 
 
To better understand the variety of operational and management functions of a 
particular SCADA system, a refinement of the function descriptions is required.  This 
thesis proposes nine concepts that should be evaluated: six are common to both 
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operational and management functions, two are relevant to operational functions only, 
and one is relevant to management functions only.  Each of these nine functions must be 
examined for all components of a SCADA system, including the boundary.  Table 3 
summarizes the concepts, which are described in more detail in the sections that follow. 
 
Table 3 The nine concepts that must be examined in order to define the operational and 
management functions of a SCADA system. 
Name Operation Functions 
Management 
Functions 
Mission X X 
Application Criticality X X 
Data Sensitivity X X 
Operating Environment X X 
System Interfaces X X 
Communications 
Requirements X X 
Hardware X  
Software X  




A clear understanding of the purpose of the component is required, in both 
operational and managerial terms.  In addition, the boundary itself must have a clearly 
defined mission which will drive the design and the interaction between other boundaries 
and components.  The individual components' missions may not be identical to the 
boundary's mission, but they will support it.  Table 4 illustrates a sample Mission analysis 
for a SCADA system that monitors electrical voltage. 
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Table 4 Sample Mission analysis for the Electrical Demonstration Laboratory 
Mission - Electrical Demonstration Laboratory 
 Operation Management 
Boundary The Electrical Demonstration 
Laboratory will remotely monitor 
the voltage levels at a control 
panel, and ensure adjustments 
to that voltage are correctly 
made.   
The Electrical Demonstration 
Laboratory will allow an operator to 
remotely control the operation of 
Process XYZ.  A historical archive of 
past voltage readings will be 
maintained in the Management 
Information System (MIS). 
Supervisory 
Control 
The operator console will 
provide an interface an operator 
to monitor the real-time voltage 
applied to the wires.  It will 
allow the operator to adjust the 
voltage within a range, and will 
sound an alarm if a discrepancy 
exists between the actual 
voltage and the voltage 
reflected on the console, 
indicating that a manual 
override condition has occurred 
at the panel. 
The operator console will provide an 
operator with an interface with which 
Process XYZ can be remotely 
controlled.   
Process  
Control 
The RTU will receive voltage 
readings from the sensor 
monitoring the wires, ensure 
that voltage is within the 
acceptable range, and store the 
current reading for retrieval by 
the operator console.  The RTU 
will receive a request from the 
operator console to change the 
voltage on the wire.  After 
verifying that the voltage is 
within acceptable limits, it will 
direct the actuator to apply the 
requested voltage to the wire.  
If the RTU detects a 
discrepancy between the 
voltage last requested by the 
operator console and the 
voltage currently on the wire, it 
will raise an alarm. 
The RTU will provide a means for 
the operator console to transmit 
requested commands (voltage 
levels) to Process XYZ in real-time, 
and allow for a means of returning 
feedback (voltage levels) from 
Process XYZ.  It will also provide an 
indication if the events requested by 
the operator console are not 





The analog voltage sensor will 
monitor the voltage flowing 
through the wire and report that 
voltage to the RTU.  The analog 
voltage actuator will receive a 
voltage command from the RTU 
and provide that voltage on the 
wire. 
The instrumentation control 
components will provide real-time 
feedback on the status of Process 
XYZ to the RTU and allow for real-





2. Application Criticality 
Since SCADA systems typically support vital distribution systems, an assessment 
of the criticality of that system will provide direction on its design and implementation, 
as well as the type of security measures to apply. The criticality must be examined both 
in terms of our system, and the individual components that make up that system.  Several 
questions must be answered: 
• Are the processes our system is monitoring of a nature that failure of the 
monitor functions will cause serious harm to the organization's mission?   
• Are the processes our system is controlling of a nature that failure of the 
control functions will cause serious harm to the organization's mission?   
• What type and level of failure of our system is acceptable?  
• Are the individual components in our system critical to the overall success 
of the system?  
• What type and level of failure of the components is acceptable?  
This examination involves a risk assessment decision that is beyond the scope of 
this thesis, but a standard risk assessment methodology will likely work.  The criticality 
of the boundary and the criticality of an individual component may not be the same, but 
they will support each other.  Table 5 describes a sample Application Criticality 
examination for a SCADA system that monitors electrical voltage. 
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Table 5 Sample Application Criticality analysis for the Electrical Demonstration 
Laboratory 
Application Criticality - Electrical Demonstration Laboratory 
 Operation Management 
Boundary The Electrical Demonstration 
Laboratory provides remote status 
reports of voltage level readings, 
and allows remote control of these 
levels.  Since there is a (local) 
control panel which allows the 
same functionality, this application 
is not deemed mission critical.   
The Electrical Demonstration 
Laboratory provides remote 
control of process XYZ.  Since 
there is an alternate means of 
locally controlling Process XYZ, 
this application is not deemed 
mission critical.   
Supervisory 
Control 
The operator console provides a 
remote interface to RTU.  This 
interface is a requirement, as the 
RTU has no inherent capability to 
report or adjust voltage levels to an 
operator without the console.  The 
operator console is thus deemed 
critical to the application. 
The operator console will 
provide an operator with an 
interface to control Process 
XYZ.  Without this console, the 
operator cannot remotely control 
the process.  Thus, the operator 
console is deemed critical to the 
application.   
Process 
Control 
The RTU is the core component of 
the remote control application. It is 
vital to the application, as the 
application can neither read nor 
adjust voltage levels remotely 
without an RTU.  The RTU is thus 
deemed critical to the application. 
The RTU is the core component 
of the remote control application. 
It is vital to the application, as 
the application can neither 
control nor monitor remotely 
without an RTU.  The RTU is 






Both the analog voltage sensor 
and actuator are vital components 
to this application.  Without the 
sensor and actuator, remote 
control of voltages is impossible. 
The sensor and actuator are thus 
deemed critical to the application. 
The instrumentation control 
components are vital to the 
ability to remotely monitor and 
control Process XYZ. They are 




3. Data Sensitivity 
SCADA systems, as noted, typically control critical systems.  Whether the data 
processed by the system is sensitive and subject to compromise or loss must be examined 
in order to determine how best to protect it.  The assessment must be made both in terms 
of the system as a whole, and as individual components, and must address both 
operational and managerial aspects.  Several questions that should be answered include:  
• Is the data returned by the process of a sensitive nature such that loss, 
modification or compromise of the data, either intentional or 
unintentional, will cause serious harm to the organization's mission? 
• Are the instructions transmitted to the process of a sensitive nature such 
that loss, modification or compromise of the instructions, either intentional 
or unintentional, will cause serious harm to the organization's mission?   
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• What type and amount of system data loss, modification or compromise is 
acceptable?   
• Is the data retained or transmitted by the individual components subject to 
loss, modification or compromise, either intentionally or unintentionally, 
to a degree that the system will be affected? 
• What level of component data loss, modification or compromise is 
acceptable? 
The sensitivity of data at the boundary and the sensitivity of data at an individual 
component will not be the same, but they will be support each other.  Aggregation of data 
may be a concern.  Table 6 describes a sample Data Sensitivity examination for a 
SCADA system that monitors electrical voltage. 
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Table 6 Sample Data Sensitivity analysis for the Electrical Demonstration Laboratory 
Data Sensitivity - Electrical Demonstration Laboratory 
 Operation Management 
Boundary The Electrical Demonstration 
Laboratory transmits voltage 
level readings in two directions 
(to the sensors and to the 
operator console, via a 
network).  This data is sensitive 
in that an incorrect reading, 
whether intentional or 
unintentional, can cause 
serious bodily harm to 
individuals or damage sensitive 
electrical equipment. 
The Electrical Demonstration 
Laboratory provides sensitive 
data; a loss or compromise of 
the data could significantly 
affect the stability of Process 
XYZ.  Further, decisions 
outside the boundary are made 
based on the application's data. 
Supervisory 
Control 
The operator console must 
accurately reflect the current 
voltage state.  It must also 
correctly indicate when an 
override condition has 
occurred.  The data at the 
console must thus be accurate 
and timely. 
The operator console must 
accurately reflect the current 
state of Process XYZ.  A high 
level of confidence is required 




Data received from the sensors 
must be stored in the RTU 
accurately and in a timely 
manner.  Requests from the 
operator console must be 
passed accurately and quickly 
to the actuators. Further, the 
data must be accurate in order 
for an override condition to be 
detected. 
The RTU must accurately and 
quickly report the status of 
Process XYZ to the operator 
console.  It must also control 
Process XYZ as the operator 





Both the analog voltage sensor 
and actuator must be reliable, 
accurate and well calibrated. 
Incorrect readings can cause a 
chain reaction of bad 
information transmitted 
throughout the entire 
application. 
The instrumentation control 
components must accurately 
report the status of Process 




4. Operating Environment 
SCADA system hardware components are designed for industrial environments, 
and thus offer robust features for operation in austere environments.  These features, 
however, do not address the management related concerns of security professionals such 
as data protection and controlled access to components.  Understanding how a SCADA 
system is designed requires understanding the environment it operates in, both for 
operations functions and management functions.  Some questions that should be 
answered include:  
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• What environmental factors will affect the process, either negatively or 
positively?  
• What environmental factors will affect the system components, either 
negatively or positively? 
• What is an acceptable level of interference by environmental factors?   
• How should these factors be mitigated? 
Table 7 describes a sample Operating Environment examination for a SCADA 
system that monitors electrical voltage. 
 
Table 7 Sample Operating Environment analysis for the Electrical Demonstration 
Laboratory 
Operating Environment - Electrical Demonstration Laboratory 
 Operation Management 
Boundary The Electrical Demonstration 
Laboratory operates in a variety 
of environmental conditions.  
The operator console is in an 
environmentally controlled room.  
The RTU, sensors and actuators 
are in an industrial space The 
network used to communicate 
between the operator console 
and the RTU is the facility LAN.  
The Electrical Demonstration 
Laboratory operates within a 
larger limited access facility.  
The operator console is in a 
locked room, and the RTU, 
sensors and actuators are in 
an open industrial space 
accessible by all personnel in 
the facility. The facility LAN is 
used to connect the operator 
console with the RTU 
Supervisory 
Control 
The operator console is in an 
environmentally controlled room.  
The operator console is in a 
locked room, with access to 
the room limited to a screened 
subset of the facility's 
personnel.   
Process 
Control 
The RTU is in an industrial 
space subject to extremes in 
temperature and humidity. The 
network used to communicate 
between the operator console 
and the RTU is within a larger 
enclosed physical area but 
operates within a logically open 
network. 
The RTU is in an open space 
accessible by all personnel in 
the facility, including 
personnel untrained and 
uncleared for access to the 
data.  The facility LAN is used 
to connect the operator 
console with the RTU; access 
to the network is available to 





The sensors and actuators are in 
an industrial space subject to 
extremes in temperature and 
humidity.  The cables used to 
monitor and control the voltage 
levels are subject to industrial 
spillage and salt water corrosion. 
The sensors and actuators 
are in an open space 
accessible by all personnel in 
the facility, including 
personnel untrained and 






5. System Interfaces 
A complex system will likely have many interfaces, each of which may become 
an avenue of attack.  All interfaces must be closely examined and evaluated in order to 
understand how it must be protected, both system wide and at the individual components.  
Some questions that should be answered include: 
• What interfaces exist for data to flow out of the system? 
• What interfaces exist for instructions to flow into the system? 
• What level of access is required to the feedback data returned by the 
process?  Who requires access to the data? 
• What level of access is required to send instructions to carry out 
commands against the process?  Who requires the capability to transmit 
instructions to the process? 
• What protections exist or can be applied to minimize the exposure of 
vulnerable interfaces by the system? 
• What interfaces exist on the components for data or instructions to flow 
into or out of the component? 
• What interfaces exist within the components for data or instructions to 
flow between components? 
• What protections exist or can be applied to minimize the exposure of 
vulnerable interfaces by the components? 
Table 8 describes a sample System Interfaces examination for a SCADA system 
that monitors electrical voltage 
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Table 8 Sample System Interfaces analysis for the Electrical Demonstration Laboratory 
System Interfaces - Electrical Demonstration Laboratory 
 Operation Management 
Boundary The Electrical Demonstration 
Laboratory provides an 
interface to the Management 
Information System through a 
Microsoft Open DataBase 
Connectivity (ODBC) server 
residing on the operator 
console.  The ODBC server 
allows queries from a variety 
of servers (web, SQL server) 
to return data.  Instructions to 
the process are executed 
through a Graphical User 
Interface (GUI) on the 
operator console. 
The Electrical Demonstration 
Laboratory provides the 
capability for external servers to 
query the data residing on a 
database on the operator 
console.  This data is queried 
every two minutes by a SQL 
server for archiving and by a 
web server for real-time status 
updates.  No modification of 
Process XYZ is performed by 
these queries. (The operator 
console is the only interface 
which allows modification of  
Process XYZ.)  The SQL server 
applies permissions to the 
queries it allows based on the 
organizational rules. The web 
server is available to all on the 
intranet.   
Supervisory 
Control 
The operator console runs the 
RSView32 implementation of 
ODBC, and is configured to 
allow queries from two 
specific servers; all other 
servers are denied access to 
the ODBC connection.  
Access is through the 
Ethernet port on the operator 
console, which is connected 
to the facility LAN.  The 
operator console is connected 
to the RTU through the same 
Ethernet port. 
The operator console runs the 
RSView32 implementation of 
ODBC, and is configured to 
allow remote LAN-based queries 
from two specific servers; all 
other servers are denied remote 
access.  The operator console is 
connected to the RTU through 
the same Ethernet port.  The 
operator console uses the built-




The RTU is connected to the 
facility LAN via an Ethernet 
connection with a static IP 
address.  There are no 
protections on the port for 
restricting access, but only the 
RSView32 software is 
believed to have the capability 
to address the RTU correctly.  
The RTU is connected to the 
sensors and actuators 
through pairs of wires from 
the Input/Output cards.  
These wires run through 
conduits from the RTU to the 
sensors and actuators. 
The RTU is connected to the 
facility LAN via an Ethernet 
connection with a static IP 
address.  There are no 
protections on the port for 
restricting access, but only the 
RSView32 software is believed 
to have the capability to address 
the RTU correctly.  The RTU is 
connected to the sensors and 
actuators through pairs of wires 





The sensors and actuators 
are directly connected to the 
RTU through wires running 
through conduits.   
The sensors and actuators are 
connected to the RTU through 
wires running through conduits. 
The conduits are shielded but 




6. Communications Requirements 
Since SCADA systems are designed for reliability, availability and data integrity, 
extra consideration must be given to confidentiality and authentication.  Other issues to 
consider include protocols employed, types of interfaces required, hardware 
configuration, and budget.  Some questions to answer include: 
• What degree of reliability is required? 
• What degree of availability is required? 
• What degree of data integrity is required? 
• What degree of confidentiality is required? 
• What overhead and latency in transmission is acceptable? 
• What is the environment the communications links must traverse? 
Answering these questions will provide a guideline as to what the tradeoff 
between performance and security will be.  Table 9 describes a sample System Interfaces 
examination for a SCADA system that monitors electrical voltage 
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Table 9 Sample Communications Requirements analysis for the Electrical Demonstration 
Laboratory 
Communications Requirements - Electrical Demonstration Laboratory 
 Operation Management 
Boundary The Electrical Demonstration 
Laboratory needs to be 
accessible to the facility LAN via 
Ethernet and TCP/IP to allow 
remote control of the voltage and 
allow archiving of data in the 
MIS.  The connections to the 
sensors and actuators are 
through wire.  Accuracy and 
integrity are more important than 
confidentiality.  Availability is a 
concern, but the local panel 
provides an alternate means of 
reading the data.  
The Electrical Demonstration 
Laboratory must allow for archival 
data to be accessible to decision 
makers, in real time and over 
TCP/IP.  Accuracy and integrity of 
the data are more important than 
the confidentiality.  Availability is a 
concern, but the local panel 
provides an alternate means of 
reading the data.  Both the 
operator console and the RTU 
have dedicated IP addresses. 
Supervisory 
Control 
The operator console requires a 
connection to the TCP/IP 
network to communicate with 
both the RTU and the MIS; this 
capability is built in to the 
operating system.  Authentication 
of the ODBC query is 
accomplished using the ODBC 
connection parameters.  Integrity 
is accomplished through the 
combined error-correction and 
detection capabilities of TCP/IP.  
There is no encryption because 
the overhead would significantly 
impact the timeliness and 
increase costs since specialized 
hardware is required. 
The operator console provides 
remote LAN-based access to the 
data using ODBC over TCP/IP, 
which ensures accuracy of data 
with minimal delay.  Authentication 
is accomplished through the 
ODBC connection configuration, 
which only accepts connections 
from the IP addresses of the 
correct servers.  No encryption is 
performed for the archival data, 
although the data is considered 
sensitive because it provides a 
status of Process XYZ. 
Process 
Control 
The RTU requires a TCP/IP 
connection to communicate with 
the operator console.  The data 
transmitted to the operator 
console must arrive correctly, 
and TCP/IP provides that 
reliability with minimal overhead 
and delay.  There are currently 
no encryption capabilities, and 
doing so would required 
specialized hardware.  The 
connection to the sensors and 
actuators is a direct wired 
connection which is not 
encrypted.  The data is raw 
voltage readings, which must 
arrive in a timely and accurate 
manner. 
The RTU employs a TCP/IP 
connection to communicate with 
the operator console.  The data 
transmitted to the operator 
console must arrive correctly, and 
TCP/IP provides that reliability 
although with a delay due to the 
overhead; this delay is not seen as 
critical.  There are currently no 
capabilities to encrypt the data 
and doing so would required 
specialized hardware.  The 
connection to the sensors and 
actuators is a direct wired 





The sensors and actuators are 
directly connected to the RTU 
through wires running through 
conduits.  There is no encryption 
due to costs and overhead. 
The sensors and actuators are 
connected to the RTU through 
wires running through conduits.  
There is no encryption due to 
costs and overhead. 
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7. Hardware and Software (Operational Functions) 
When discussing operational functions of a SCADA system, the hardware and 
software to be used must also be evaluated.  In the context of standard SCADA systems, 
reliability, stability and safety are primary concerns.  Adding a security perspective 
introduces the concept of assurance, or ensuring that the hardware and software have 
minimal exploitable flaws.  Questions to answer include:  
• What degree of reliability should the system have with respect to software 
and hardware? 
• What degree of assurance should the system have with respect to software 
and hardware? 
• What degree of reliability do the components require in order to 
effectively satisfy the system's mission?  
• What degree of assurance do the components require? 
• Has the hardware been tested for reliability, safety, assurance, stability?   
• Has the software undergone a formal documented software development 
process?  
• Have the software and hardware formally analyzed or evaluated by a 
trusted third party?   
• What is the configuration management and lifecycle maintenance process 
for the software, and the firmware update process for the hardware? 
• What maintenance is required for the hardware? 
 
8. Users and Personnel Actions (Management Functions) 
When discussing management functions, the users of the system and its 
components must also be evaluated.  In addition, the automated decision making that is 
programmed into the system must be evaluated in the same terms.  Some questions to 
answer include:  
• Are the users cleared for all functions of the system? Which functions 
require clearance? 
• What degree of automation of decision making is required before human 
intervention is required? 
• What training do the users receive?  
• What are the different roles required for operating the system? 
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• What are the different roles required for maintaining the system? 
 
9. Conclusion 
The nine considerations outlined above (summarized in Figure 11) must be 
examined for each component of the system in addition to the system as a whole, and 
must be examined in terms of both operational and managerial functions.  The "matrix" 
approach will provide the necessary framework for understanding a SCADA system, its 
interfaces and communications requirements, and will serve to better define the security 
requirements and the countermeasures that must be employed to protect it.  Chapter IV 
employs this methodology against the NPS SCADA Technology Testing Laboratory 
Model to illustrate how it can be beneficial. 
 
 
Figure 11 A SCADA system and its components must be evaluated in terms of nine 




The examples in the previous sections described scenarios that relied on a 
common communications infrastructure, mainly a TCP/IP Local Area Network.  SCADA 
systems, by their very specialized nature, have unique communications requirements.  
Communications protocols (especially at the lower layers) are designed to meet the 
requirement that information arrive without errors in a timely manner (availability and 
data integrity).  Confidentiality and authentication are not considerations in any of the 
existing SCADA protocols. 
SCADA communications at the Field Instrumentation and Process Control layers 
will normally occur at Layer 1 (Physical) and Layer 2 (Data Link) of the standard Open 
System Interconnection (OSI) 7-Layer model; anything above the Data Link layer is 
difficult to define due to the specialized equipment available to SCADA consumers.  
Normally OSI Layers 3-6 (Network, Transport, Session, Presentation) are not even 
employed, and Layer 7 (Application) applications will normally communicate directly 
with the Data Link layer. Figure 12 illustrates the typical means of communications 
between SCADA components, which are detailed below. 
 
Figure 12 Typical SCADA systems will communicate through a variety of methods and 
protocols between components and layers. 
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1. Communications Among Supervisory Control Peers 
At the Supervisory Control layer between peers, communications are usually 
through a standard networking protocol such as TCP/IP or IPX over Ethernet or Token 
Ring.  The SCADA applications involved in the communications are typically installed 
on standard PC systems capable of using standard operating-system provided protocols.  
Options exist for employing proprietary protocols between peers from the same 
manufacturer or SCADA-specific open source protocols between peers of dissimilar 
manufacturers.   
 
2. Communications Between Supervisory Control and Process Control 
and Among Process Control Peers 
The means of communications between Supervisory Control and Process Control, 
as well as among Process Control peers, vary greatly and are usually dependent on 
hardware manufacturer.  If a suite of RTUs, sensors and actuators is purchased from a 
single vendor, the protocol may be proprietary.  Recent trends indicate a move to the 
option of using open source protocols in order to incorporate a variety of manufacturer's 
equipment, but the primary means of communication is typically a proprietary protocol.  
The protocols are designed for assurance and speed of delivery, requirements for a typical 
SCADA system managing a critical process. Interfaces can be proprietary, although 
many manufacturers support RS-232, and radio modems are often used to communicate 
with remote locations over microwave or Radio Frequency (RF) signals.  Dedicated 
Ethernet networks are gaining wide acceptance, primarily due to the reliability of high-
speed Ethernet where collisions are minimized.  Encryption is rarely employed in these 
communications links, primarily due to the latency that encryption and decryption will 
cause. 
3. Communications between Process Control and Field Instrumentation 
Control  
Communications between Process Control and Field Instrumentation Control is 
typically a point to point running over wire pairs, transmitting voltage pulses that are 
interpreted by the RTU based on how it is programmed.  Recent trends in "intelligent" 
sensors and actuators provide more capabilities, and allow for peer to peer or distributed 
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networks among sensors and actuators; protocols in intelligent sensors will primarily be 
proprietary and vary among manufacturers. 
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IV. LABORATORY CONFIGURATION 
The Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) Technology Testing and 
Demonstration  Model (SCADA Lab) at the Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) provides a 
functioning SCADA system in a laboratory setting using Rockwell Automation software 
and Allen-Bradley hardware.  As part of this thesis, the configuration and installation of 
the laboratory components was initiated.  The following sections outline two simple 
components of the lab.  Follow on work will expand the lab facilities and provide an 
environment for further research and classroom instruction. 
A. HARDWARE CONFIGURATION 
The process control equipment in the NPS SCADA Lab incorporates industry-
standard software from Rockwell Automation and hardware from Allen-Bradley, a 
subsidiary of Rockwell Automation.  The non-process control hardware and software in 
the laboratory is industry-standard and widely available. 
1. SLC-5/05 
The SLC-5/05 is the latest in a sub-series of programmable process controllers 
developed by Allen-Bradley and marketed by Rockwell Automation.  The SLC-500 
series of controllers is designed for modularity and expandability, and provides flexibility 
in meeting feedback, control and communications requirements.  They can be employed 
as standalone systems or as a component of a distributed control system, in either a local 
or remote locations, and can employ a wide range of communications for either 
management or process control.  The modularity, expandability and reliability of the 
SLC-500 series accounts for its popularity and explains why the series is one of the more 
pervasive in the industry. 
a. Processor 
The SLC-5/05 model is characterized by a built-in Ethernet port to provide 
a means of communication with the controller for management functions.  The Ethernet 
port can provide transport for TCP/IP and other protocols.  Table 10 outlines the 




Table 10 Features of the SLC-5/05 Programmable Controller [22] 
Feature SLC-5/05 (Model 1747-L551) Comments 
Memory Size (words) 16k Other versions offer 32k or 64k 
Power Supply 
Loading 
1.0mA at 5v dc 
200mA at 24v dc 
Depending on availability of power at 
remote locations, end users can select 
either 5v dc or 24 dc to power sensors 
and other devices. 
Max I/O Capacity 4096 discrete inputs and 
outputs 
Over four thousand sensors or control 




3/30 Up to three chassis may be connected 
to one processor, with no more than 30 
slots (for modules) employed at once. 
On-board 
communications 
Ethernet and RS-232 Other models offer DH+ (Data Highway 
Plus) or DH-485 protocols.  The 




107 instructions The programming is performed through 
programming software IDEs, usually 
installed on a PC and connected to the 
processor through Ethernet or RS-232. 
Typical Scan Time 0.9 ms/K The processor will scan through all of 
the input and output ports on the 
modules in this time period. 
 
b. Chassis & Power Supply 
The modular nature of the SLC-500 series implies a chassis-based design.  
Depending on the user requirements, Allen-Bradley offers either a 4-, 7-, 10- or 13-slot 
chassis [22]; the SLC-5/05 occupies one slot, freeing up the remaining slots for modules 
that provide input and output capabilities to sensors and actuators.  If more than one 
chassis is to be employed locally (up to 3, with a maximum total of 30 slots), a ribbon 
cable connects the chassis.  If the second or third chassis is to be remoted, one slot in the 
local chassis is reserved for a scanner module that communicates with an adapter module 
in the remote chassis.   
The NPS SCADA Lab employs a 7-slot chassis, with an extra 3-slot 
chassis in reserve or for future expansion. 
                                                 
3 Allen-Bradley and Rockwell Automation offer a variety of communications options for their 
products, both proprietary and open source.  DH+ and DH-485 are proprietary.   More information about 
the communications options available can be found at  
http://www.ab.com/en/epub/catalogs/12762/2181376/214372/ (18 September 2004) 
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A variety of power supplies are available depending on requirements.  The 
SLC-5/05 and chassis can be powered either through AC (85v to 265v ac) or DC (10v to 
140v dc).  The power supplies are attached to an external edge of the chassis.   
The NPS SCADA Lab uses the Allen-Bradley Model1746-P1 power 
supply.  Table 11 describes the capabilities of the 1746-P1 power supply. 
 
Table 11 1747-P1 Power Supply Characteristics [22] 
Feature 1746-P1 Power Supply 
Line Voltage 85 to 132V ac 
170 to 265V ac 
(47 to 63Hz) 
Internal Current Capacity 2A at 5V dc 
0.46A at 24V dc 
Maximum Inrush Current 20A 
24V dc User Power Current Capacity 200mA 
24V dc User Power Voltage Range 18-30V dc 
 
c. Analog Input/Output Modules 
(1) Input. The NPS SCADA Lab is configured for the 
following analog input modules: 
• Allen-Bradley Model 1746-NI8.  It provides eight analog input ports 
addressable as either voltage (-10vDC to +10vDC) or current (-20mA to 
+20mA).  [22] 
• Allen-Bradley Model 1746-NIO4V.  It is a dual function module that 
provides two analog input ports and two analog output ports.  The input 
ports are addressable as either voltage (-10vDC to +10vDC) or current  
(-20mA to +20mA). The output ports are addressable only as voltage  
(-10vDC to +10vDC). [22] 
(2) Output. The NPS SCADA Lab is configured for the 
following analog output modules: 
• Allen-Bradley Model 1746-NO4V. It provides four analog output ports 
addressable as voltage (-10vDC to +10vDC). [22] 
• Allen-Bradley Model 1746-NIO4V.  It is a dual function module that 
provides two analog input ports and two analog output ports.  The input 
ports are addressable as either voltage (-10vDC to +10vDC) or current  
(-20mA to +20mA). The output ports are addressable only as voltage  
(-10vDC to +10vDC). [22] 
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d. Digital Input/Output Modules 
The NPS SCADA Lab employs the Allen-Bradley Model 1746-
IO12DC, a dual-function digital module that provides six input and six output ports with 
an operating ("on") range of 10vDC to 30vDC and an "off" range of 0vDC to 5vDC. [22] 
2. Programming Console 
a. Hardware Configuration Baseline 
The minimum requirements, per the Rockwell Automation literature, are 
as follows: 
• Intel Pentium II or greater microprocessor (Recommended: 500-MHz 
Pentium) 
• 128MB of RAM for WinNT, Win2K or WinXP, 54MB RAM for Win98 
• 45MB of HDD, or 115MB for additional options 
• 256-color SVGA graphics adapter with 800x600 resolution 
• CD-ROM Drive 
• 3.5-inch 1.44 MB Disk Drive (required for software activation) 
• Windows-compatible pointing device [23] 
The systems in the NPS SCADA Lab meet or exceed these requirements and have the 
following properties: 
• Intel Pentium 4 2.6GHz 
• 1GB of RAM  
• 120GB of HDD 
• 32 bit NVIDIA GeForce4 MX graphics adapter with 1280x1024 
resolution 
• CD-ROM Drive 
• 3.5-inch 1.44 MB Disk Drive  
• Windows-compatible pointing device 
• Broadcom 440X 10/100 MBit Ethernet Adapter 
 
b. Software Configuration Baseline 
The minimum requirements, per the Rockwell Automation literature, are 
one of either Windows 98, Windows 2000, Windows NT (Service Pack 6 or greater), or 
Windows XP [23].  The NPS SCADA Lab systems meet the Windows XP requirement. 
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3. Operator Console 
a. Hardware Configuration Baseline 
The requirements outlined in the Rockwell Automation literature vary 
depending on the complexity of the projects that the operator is intended to control.  On 
the low end, Rockwell Automation recommends a Pentium 100 MHz CPU with 24MB 
RAM system.  A more complex system may require a system similar to the one outlined 
above in the "Programming Console" section. [24] 
The NPS SCADA Lab systems meets or exceeds these requirements. 
b. Software Configuration Baseline 
The minimum requirements, per the Rockwell Automation literature, are 
one of either Windows 98, Windows 2000, Windows NT (Service Pack 6 or greater), or 
Windows XP [24].  The NPS SCADA Lab systems meet the Windows XP requirement. 
4. Laboratory Configuration 
a. Simple Electrical Lab 
(1) Overview.  A standard electrical panel, approximately 
8"x8"x3", is used to demonstrate a simple SCADA electrical feedback and control 
system.  A volt meter, a dial knob, and a switch are installed on the panel, and the panel 
is powered from the SLC-5/05 through the Analog Output module. 
The volt meter measures and displays the voltage passing through 
the panel components; this same reading is passed to the SLC-5/05 through an analog 
Input/Output module to display on the operator console.  The operator console provides a 
means for adjusting the voltage up or down remotely. 
A switch allows for manual “override” control of the voltage 
passing through the panel.  When this switch is closed, the voltage can be controlled at 
the panel, illustrating a "Manual Override" capability common in many applications. The 
voltage control knob on the panel now has full control over adjustment of the voltage.  
With the switch closed, if the voltage on the panel is adjusted, an alarm on the operator 
console indicates that a manual override condition has occurred. 
The SCADA control features in this example are illustrated by the 
ability to control the voltage passing through the panel from the operator console.  The 
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SLC-5/05 CPU will interpret the operator’s desired direction of adjustment and transmit 
the required analog signals to the panel. 
Two mechanisms are employed to illustrate the SCADA feedback 
features.  In the first case, the voltage passing through the panel is relayed to the SLC-
5/05 through an analog Input/Output module.  In the second case, when the voltage on 
the panel is adjusted by an operator while in manual override mode, an alarm is raised on 
the operator console. The operator, after investigation, can reset the status of the override 
indicator. 
 
 (2) Physical Configuration - The SLC-5/05 is configured with 
an analog Input module that reads the voltage from the panel.  This reading is processed 
and stored in a register in the SLC-5/05's Central Processing Unit (CPU).  The SLC-5/05 
is also configured with an analog Output module that supplies voltage to the panel, 
ranging from 0vDC to 10vDC.  This voltage is controlled by adjusting the value in a 
register in the SLC-5/05 CPU. 
The Input/Output modules are connected to the panel via two sets 
of wire pairs, configured as shown in Figure 13.  The switch, manual override dial, and 
meter all receive voltage supplied from the Analog Output module in the SLC-5/05. 
 





 (3) Electrical Configuration - The electrical diagram in Figure 
14 illustrates the basic electrical configuration for the lab.  Power is supplied to the lab 
through the Analog Output module. 
 
Figure 14 Electrical Overview of Simple Electrical Lab 
 
 
b. Simple Mechanical Lab 
(1) Overview. A wood block, approximately 2"x4"x7", serves 
as the housing for the components to illustrate the control and feedback mechanisms of 
this demonstration SCADA system.  The robotic arm is attached to the housing along the 
top-most side.  The housing is divided into three sections, labeled A, B and C.  Embedded 
photo-electric sensors are found in each of the sections.   
The operator console is programmed to receive the current location 
of a simulated barrel of hazardous materials from one of the three photo-electric sensors.  
Based on this information, the operator will have the option of moving the barrel to a 
different section of the housing using the robotic arm.  The operator console also has an 
“Emergency Stop” option.  There are no local controls  as in the Simple Electrical Lab. 
The SCADA control features in this example are illustrated by the 
robot arm, powered by a 9v battery (for the CPU) and 120v AC (for the servos).   
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The SLC-5/05 processor controls the robotic arm via the built-in 
RS-232 port, passing a series of three bytes through pins 3 (signal data) and 5 (signal 
ground) to the controller on the robot.  The three bytes determine which servo to move (0 
through 4) and the relative location across a 90 degree span.  The operator can instruct 
the robot arm to perform any of a pre-determined set of actions. 
The SCADA feedback features in this example are illustrated by 
three photo-electric sensors embedded in the housing.  Each sensor is fed into a port pair 
in the analog Input/Output module of the SLC-5/05. 
Since each sensor is independent of the other, the SLC-5/05 
controller can determine when the barrel is covering any of the sensors, and will provide 
that feedback information to the operator console. 
(2) Physical Configuration.  An analog Input module receives 
voltage signals from the sensors via a pair of wires for each sensor, and stores the values 
in a register in the SLC-5/05 CPU.  Logic programming in the CPU assesses the voltage 
reading from a sensor and determines if the sensor is currently covered or open, storing a 
bit value in another CPU register.  This value is queried by the operator console regularly 
to determine the location of the barrel. 
The robotic arm is connected to the SLC-5/05 by a standard 4-wire 
telephone cord (only two wires of which are actually used), plugged into a RJ-11 modular 
jack on the robot and a RS-232 connector in the RS-232 port of the SLC-5/05.   
The robot arm is mounted on a housing as shown in Figure 15 and 
Figure 16. The sensors are embedded, evenly spaced in the housing, perpendicular to the 
center point of the robot arm. 
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Figure 16 Photograph of Simple Mechanical Lab 
 
 
(3) Electrical Configuration.  Figure 17 illustrates the electrical 
configuration of the Simple Mechanical Lab.  Power is supplied to the robotic arm CPU 
through a 9-volt battery.  Power is supplied to the robotic arm servos through a 
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manufacturer-supplied 120vAC power adapter. The sensors are powered by a 9-volt 
battery. 
 





4. Network and Communications 
Since the NPS SCADA Lab simulates the real-world employment of SCADA 
systems, namely Internet-based management and control, the laboratory network has 
been designed to allow for notional access to the SLC-5/05 hardware through the NPS 
Local Area Network (LAN).  The SLC-5/05 has been assigned a dedicated IP address by 
the NPS Information Technology and Communications Services (ITACS) office, and is 
currently accessible from anywhere on the NPS network.  A series of hubs and switches 
co-located with the SLC-5/05 allow for physical separation from the NPS network if 
desired, allowing for attacks against the system to be performed without impacting users 
of the regular NPS LAN.  This configuration, illustrated in Figure 18, allows for future 
research on incorporating firewalls, or other security protection mechanisms, into a 
SCADA protection plan. 
51 
 
Figure 18 Network Topology 
 
 
B. SOFTWARE CONFIGURATION 
1. Programming Console 
a. RSLinx (Communications) 
RSLinx runs on both the Programming Console and the Operator Console, 
and provides the communication subsystem for links between the Windows-based 
computer and the programmable controller.  As shown in Figure 19, RSLinx provides an 
interface for Rockwell Automation software (RSLogix500, RSView) to communicate 
with Rockwell Automation hardware products.  It has an Application Programming 
Interface (API) which supports custom applications, and can serve as an Open Process 
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Control (OPC) Data Access Compliant Server4 or as a Dynamic Data Exchange (DDE) 
Server.  
RSLinx maintains a database of available Rockwell and Allen-Bradley 
hardware and software that can be used to easily configure the communications link 
between the two.  In addition to a selection of hardware available, RSLinx also maintains 
a list of protocols that can be used to communicate with the hardware.  RSLinx runs in 
the background and is started automatically upon boot-up of the Windows machine. 
 
Figure 19 The RSLinx Software package from Rockwell Software provides an interface 
between the client application and the underlying process control protocol.   
 
RSLinx in the NPS SCADA Lab is configured for Ethernet Access to the 
SLC-5/05, and provides interfaces for monitoring the status of the connection, as shown 
in Figure 20.  It is also configured to employ TCP/IP over Ethernet. 
                                                 
4 Open Process Control (OPC), also known as Object Linking and Embedding (OLE) for Process 
Control, is a series of specifications for supporting open connectivity in industrial automation. OPC uses 
Microsoft Distributed Component Object Model (DCOM) technology to provide a communication link 
between OPC servers and OPC clients. 
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Figure 20 This screenshot from RSLinx illustrates the main screen, showing the 
Ethernet driver configured to communicate with a SLC-5/05 programmable 
controller.   
 
b. RSLogix500 (Programming IDE) 
RSLogix500 operates on the Programmer Console, and provides the 
integrated development environment (IDE) for programming the Rockwell or Allen-
Bradley controllers.  Programming can be conducted off-line and downloaded to the 
controller, or can be conducted on-line with changes taking effect immediately.   Figure 
21 illustrates a screenshot of the RSLogix500 main screen, and has been annotated to 
illustrate the basic components and actions available to a programmer. 
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Figure 21 A screenshot of the RSView32 IDE main screen, annotated to show the 
different SLC-5/05 control functions available to a programmer. 
 
 
c. RSView32 Works (Operator Interface IDE) 
RSView32 Works provides an IDE for development of operator console 
applications.  It provides libraries and pre-built components that can be used to design 
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sophisticated graphical user interfaces (GUI) that can interface with Rockwell or Allen-
Bradley controllers directly.  While RSLogix 500 provides an interface to program the 
controller, RSView32 Works provides an interface on which to build custom applications 
that can interact with a controller.  RSView32 Works, for example, can develop the 
application that a shipboard operator would use to monitor pressure levels in a fuel line.  
Figure 22 shows a sample RSView32 Works application, presenting an attractive 
interface to an operator who is responsible for monitoring a process. 
 
Figure 22 A screenshot of a RSView32 Works sample application showing an operator 
interface to a process monitoring system. [19] 
 
2. Operator Console 
a. RSLinx (Communications) 
RSLinx runs on both the Programming Console and the Operator Console, 
and provides the communication subsystem for links between the Windows-based 
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computer and the programmable controller.  RSLinx provides an interface for Rockwell 
Automation software (RSLogix500, RSView) to communicate with Rockwell 
Automation hardware products.  It has an Application Programming Interface (API) 
which supports custom applications, and can serve as an Open Process Control (OPC) 
Data Access Compliant Server or as a Dynamic Data Exchange (DDE) Server.  
RSLinx maintains a database of available Rockwell and Allen-Bradley 
hardware and software that can be used to easily configure the communications link 
between the two.  In addition to a selection of hardware available, RSLinx also maintains 
a list of protocols that can be used to communicate with the hardware.  RSLinx runs in 
the background and is started automatically upon boot-up of the Windows machine. 
b. RSView32 Runtime (Operator Interface) 
RSView32 Works provides an IDE for development of operator console 
applications.  It provides libraries and pre-built components that can be used to design 
sophisticated graphical user interfaces (GUI) that can interface with Rockwell or Allen-
Bradley controllers directly.  While RSLogix 500 provides an interface to program the 
controller, RSView32 Works provides an interface on which to build custom applications 
that can interact with a controller.  RSView32 Works, for example, can develop the 
application that a shipboard operator would use to monitor pressure levels in a fuel line.  
Figure 22 shows a sample RSView32 Works application, presenting an attractive 
interface to an operator who is responsible for monitoring a process. 
3. SLC-5/05 
a. Simple Electrical Lab 
(1) Overview.  The simple electrical lab consists of two 
software components, the operator console and the SLC-5/05 ladder logic program.  The 
operator interface, shown in Figure 23, provides several ways for the operator to adjust 
the voltage of the system: pushbuttons in .5vDC increments; "maximum voltage" and a 
"minimum voltage" pushbuttons; and a slider bar for incremental adjustments.  The 
operator interface provides four means of displaying voltage: a vertical bar; an analog 
dial meter; a digital voltage readout, and a percentage of maximum readout.  The 
interface also has an alarm indicating that a manual override condition has occurred, 
along with a reset button for the operator to use once the override condition has been 
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corrected.  The binary RSView32 Works file that defines the interface is found on the 
operator console terminal's hard disk drive in the NPS SCADA Lab at 





Figure 23 The main operator interface for the Simple Electrical Lab, showing the 
manual override alarm engaged. 
 
(2) Ladder Logic Structure.  The ladder logic program for the 
Simple Electrical Lab is located in Appendix B.  Conceptually, the program follows the 




Figure 24 The logical flow of the Simple Electrical Lab Ladder Logic program. 
 
 
The ladder logic program, reproduced in Appendix B, is loaded in 
the SLC-5/05 CPU, with the original file located on the operator console terminal's hard 
disk drive in the NPS SCADA Lab at C:\LABFILES\RSLOGIX\. The Simple Electrical 
Lab ladder logic is one portion of the SLC-5/05 ladder logic program called 
SCADALAB.RSS; it is the tab within the program called "Electrical." This file should be 
opened with RSLogix 500 application.  
 
b. Simple Mechanical Lab 
(1) Overview.  The Simple Mechanical Lab consists of two 
software components, the operator interface and the ladder logic.  The operator interface, 
illustrated in Figure 25, shows the current position of the simulated barrel of hazardous 
materials based on feedback from the sensors.  The position of the barrel determines 
which of the three allowable actions (seen in the three buttons on the right side of the 
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interface in Figure 25) are available to the operator. The Emergency Stop feature will halt 
the robot movement after centering.   
The data that determines the movement of the robot is coded in a 
set of three text files located on the operator console.  Each file contains a series of 
instructions that will move the robot arm in one direction, and each instruction is sent 
individually to the SLC-5/05 for processing.  The format of the commands is found in 
Appendix C, and the text files are found on the operator console terminal's hard disk 
drive in the NPS SCADA Lab at C:\LABFILES\ROBOT\MOVEMENT\.  The binary 
RSView32 Works file that defines the interface is found in C:\LABFILES\ROBOT\.   
 
 
Figure 25 The main operator interface for the Simple Mechanical Lab, showing the 
current position of the simulated barrel at Position A. 
 
(2) Ladder Logic Structure. The ladder logic program for the 
Simple Electrical Lab is located in Appendix B.  Conceptually, the program follows the 




Figure 26 The logical flow of the Simple Mechanical Lab Ladder Logic program. 
 
The ladder logic program, reproduced in Appendix B, is loaded in 
the SLC-5/05 CPU, with the original file located on the operator console terminal's hard 
disk drive in the NPS SCADA Lab at C:\LABFILES\RSLOGIX\. The Simple 
Mechanical Lab ladder logic is one portion of the SLC-5/05 ladder logic program called 
SCADALAB.RSS; it is the tab within the program called "Robot." This file should be 
opened with RSLogix 500 application.  
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C. APPLICABILITY OF ARCHITECTURAL ANALYSIS TO 
LABORATORY 
The NPS SCADA Lab can be described in terms of the Architectural Analysis 
outlined in Chapter III.  The following sections describe both the Simple Electrical Lab 
and the Simple Mechanical Lab in terms of the steps given in the Architectural Analysis. 
1. Simple Electrical Laboratory 
a. Boundary 
The boundary of the Simple Electrical Lab is illustrated in Figure 27.  The 
Supervisory Control Layer contains the Personal Computer that serves as both the 
operator console and the programming console, running RSLinx, RSLogic 500, and 
RSView32 Works..  The SLC-5/05 (minus the input/output modules) is in the Process 
Control Layer, and the input/output modules, while physically located within the SLC-















Figure 27 The boundary for the Simple Electrical Lab. 
 
b. Operational and Management Functions Analysis 
Table 12 contains the Operational Functions analysis of the Simple 
Electrical Lab, while Table 13 contains the Management Functions analysis.
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Table 12 The Operational Functions analysis for the Simple Electrical Lab 
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After completing the analysis, a security professional can better evaluate 
the security requirements for this system.  In the Simple Electrical Lab, it is immediately 
obvious that the system is a low criticality system that does not require high assurance 
against compromise.  However, several issues arise based on the results of this analysis: 
• The operating system on the personal computer will require regular 
configuration management and patch application. 
• The personal computer is connected to the NPS intranet, and thus must be 
treated at the same level of assurance as any other machine connected to 
the intranet. 
• Some of the software on the personal computer is esoteric, and thus could 
be compromised by an intruder without any obvious outward signs to 
inexperienced users of the computer. 
• The SLC-5/05 controller is connected to the NPS intranet, and its flaws 
are not well known.  An intruder who manages to bypass the NPS physical 
or network security controls could compromise the controller and at a best 
disable the laboratory, and at worse the intruder could use the controller as 
a vector of attack against other targets. 
• While the lab is a low voltage circuit with minimal current, there is still 
potential for mild electric shock that could result in damage to sensitive 
electrical components.  While the controller and the modules within it are 
designed to take precautions to avoid this possibility, the system still needs 
to be monitored for potential safety issues. 
• While the SLC-5/05 processor and the modules are not vital for the proper 
operation of the lab (the voltage can be controlled at the panel), they are 
considered vital for a proper demonstration of a SCADA system.  This 
highlights well the distinction between operational and management 
analyses, and could affect how a security professional protects the system. 
 
 
2. Simple Mechanical Laboratory 
a. Boundary 
The boundary of the Simple Mechanical Lab is illustrated in Figure 28.  
The Supervisory Control Layer contains the Personal Computer that serves as both the 
operator console and the programming console, running RSLinx, RSLogic 500, and 
RSView32 Works..  The SLC-5/05 (minus the input/output modules and the RS-232 port) 
is in the Process Control Layer.  The RS-232 port and the input/output modules, while 
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physically located within the SLC-5/05, are logically located in the Field Instrumentation 
Control layer.  The light-sensitive sensors are in the Field Instrumentation Control layer. 
 
Figure 28 The boundary for the Simple Mechanical Lab. 
 
 
b. Operational and Management Functions Analysis 
Table 14 contains the Operational Functions analysis of the Simple 
Mechanical Lab, while Table 15 contains the Management Functions analysis. 
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Table 14 The Operational Functions analysis for the Simple Mechanical Lab 
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Table 15 The Management Functions analysis for the Simple Mechanical Lab 
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After completing the analysis, a security professional can better evaluate 
the security requirements for this system.  In the Simple Mechanical Lab, it is 
immediately obvious that it is a low criticality system that does not require high 
assurance against compromise.  However, several issues arise based on the results of this 
analysis: 
 
• The operating system on the personal computer will require regular 
configuration management and patch application. 
• The personal computer is connected to the NPS intranet, and thus must be 
treated at the same level of assurance as any other machine connected to 
the intranet. 
• Some of the software on the personal computer is esoteric, and thus could 
be compromised by an intruder without any obvious outward signs to 
inexperienced users of the computer. 
• The SLC-5/05 controller is connected to the NPS intranet, and its flaws 
are not well known.  An intruder who manages to bypass the NPS physical 
or network security controls could compromise the controller and at a best 
disable the laboratory, and at worse the intruder could use the controller as 
a vector of attack against other targets. 
• While the lab is a low voltage circuit, there is still potential for electric 
shock that could result in damage to sensitive electrical components.  
While the controller and the modules within it are designed to take 
precautions to avoid this possibility, the system still needs to be monitored 
for potential safety issues. 
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V. SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. SUMMARY 
Control systems are prevalent through almost every sector of the economy, 
including those that comprise the critical infrastructure.  Supervisory Control and Data 
Acquisition (SCADA) systems are one implementation of control systems, defined in this 
thesis as control systems involved in the distribution of a commodity.  All SCADA 
systems have in common three layers: 
• Supervisory Control 
• Process Control 
• Field Instrumentation Control 
SCADA systems can implement a number of proprietary or open protocols to 
communicate across the three layers.  Business systems establish policies and procedures 
for the system, and describe the process that is to be regulated.  Boundaries are defined 
around components based on physical or functional characteristics, and are difficult to 
establish for complex or large SCADA systems.   
SCADA systems can be defined by both operational and managerial functions; 
the unique capability of SCADA systems to operate for extended periods without human 
intervention requires that an active management plan be adopted to meet policy 
objectives, particularly with security concerns.  The operational functions can be 
described in terms of eight concepts: 
• Mission 
• Application Criticality 
• Data Sensitivity 
• Operating Environment 
• System Interfaces 






The management functions can be described in terms of seven concepts: 
• Mission 
• Application Criticality 
• Data Sensitivity 
• Operating Environment 
• System Interfaces 
• Communications Requirements 
• Users and Personnel Action 
Clearly defining these concepts for operational and management functions, and 
thoroughly understanding the implications that multiple boundaries can have on policy, 
helps in understanding a SCADA system's features, functions and capabilities, and thus 
how it can be protected.  
A sample laboratory has been designed at the Naval Postgraduate School's 
SCADA Technology Testing Lab and Demonstration Model which can be described by 
the framework outlined above.   This laboratory, built using industry standard hardware 
and software from Allen-Bradley and Rockwell, provides two working SCADA systems 
simulating real-world control applications. 
B. RECOMMENDATIONS 
Based on research work conducted for this thesis, the following recommendations 
are made: 
1. SCADA systems currently in operation should be re-evaluated against the 
framework presented in this thesis to determine if they meet minimum requirements 
for security. 
2. New SCADA system designs should be evaluated with this framework as 
a guide to understand the security implications of the design. 
3. Further research should be conducted on the implications of intersecting 
boundaries, and the effect on conflicting policies.  Research on how best to 
systematically define boundaries should be conducted. 
4. A formal analysis of the various open and proprietary communications 
protocols should be conducted to determine their suitability for high assurance 
SCADA systems. 
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5. A formal analysis of the software and hardware components of various 
vendor products should be conducted to determine their suitability for high assurance 
SCADA systems.  Rockwell Automation and Allen-Bradley are leading developers 
and vendors of SCADA systems and their products have wide employment 
worldwide.  Partnerships with Rockwell Automation and Allen-Bradley should be 
established to ensure access to source code and schematics for further research. 
Rockwell Automation has informally expressed an interest in partnering with NPS. 
6. Partnerships with critical infrastructure agencies and organizations should 
be established to further our understanding of the real-world employment of SCADA 
systems.  This partnership should include an assessment of current policies and 
practices. 
7. An analysis of commercially available link encryption products should be 
conducted for SCADA systems where confidentiality, non-repudiation, or integrity of 
data is required.  The Cisco Systems Critical Infrastructure Assurance Group 
(http://www.cisco.com/security_services/ciag/) is currently researching and 
marketing such a line of products. 
8. More realistic and complex SCADA systems should be developed at the 
NPS SCADA Technology Testing Lab.  These systems should then be studied for 
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APPENDIX A - SCADA PROTOCOLS 
1. IEC 60870 
IEC-60870-5-101 (or T101) defines message structure for bit-serial 
communications over low bandwidth channels using existing widely used standards 
covering exchange between data terminal equipment (DTE) and data communication 
equipment (DCE).  T101 defines link layer and application layer message format, as 
shown in Figure 29.  This is a variable length frame; however, two fixed length frames 
are defined (which carry no data) for link layer control and acknowledgement messages. 
[25] 
The maximum frame size is 261 bytes.  The address field may be either 1 or 2 
bytes, determined by a fixed system parameter and defined in advance of transmission, 
and defines the "secondary" recipient link layer address (for a multi-station network, a 
"primary" station is defined, and all other stations are secondary.  If a primary station 
sends a message, the Address field will contain the secondary stations address.  If a 
secondary station sends a message, the Address field will contain its own address so that 
the master station can identify who the message is from.) [25] 
In IEC 60870-5-104 (or T104), the link layer definitions are not defined, as it is 
assumed that the transport and networking is performed with TCP/IP.  The Application 
Service Data Unit (ASDU) as shown in the right hand side of Figure 29 is preserved. 
In both T101 and T104, the number of ASDUs is limited to one for each message, 
and only one data type ("Type ID") is permitted for each ASDU, and the Type ID is the 
first field in the ASDU.  The Type ID defines the general content of the message, whether 
it is process information, system information, parameters, or a file transfer.  The Type ID 
will also define the direction the message is flowing, whether to the monitor station or to 
the control station.  Reference [25] contains a table listing the 127 defined Type IDs. 
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Figure 29 Message Structure under IEC 60870-5-101 (bit serial links). (After Ref. [25]) 
 
The ASDU Variable Structure Qualifier field specifies the number of information 
objects and how they are addressed in the message.  The Cause of Transmission field is 
used at the recipient station to determine the correct task or program for processing the 
information object.  The Common Address field is either one or two bytes and defines the 
recipient that will process the information objects.  (It is called "Common Address" 
because all of the data contained in the message is destined for the same recipient.) 
The Information Objects contain the actual data that is of interest to the SCADA 
process.  There may be multiple information objects of different types in one message, or 
there may be one information object with multiple data values of the same type.  The 
forty different types of information objects are divided into seven broad categories: 
Process, Protection, Commands, Time, Qualifiers, File Transfer, and Miscellaneous.  
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Clark and Reynders provide a list of information object types, and a detailed description 
of each. [25] 
 
2. DNP3 
Distributed Network Protocol Version 3.3 (DNP3) is similar in function and 
purpose to IEC-60870-5-101, with which it shares a common origin.  It is designed for 
reliably transmitting small packets of data in a deterministic, in-order sequence, which 
differentiates it from TCP/IP protocols and thus makes it more suitable for SCADA 
applications.   
DNP3's link layer functionality allows for link initialization and error recovery 
and provides status indications to higher levels.  Clark and Reynders describe the 
functions available in DNP3's link layer [26]. DNP3 introduces a Transport Layer (see 
Figure 30), which functions solely to disassemble large Application Layer data blocks 
into small enough for the Link Layer to transport.  Because of this limited functionality, it 
is referred to as a pseudo-transport layer.  The Transport Layer's one byte header provides 
disassembly and reassembly information so that 2048 byte data blocks from the 
application layer can be broken up into 250 byte blocks prior to delivery to the Link 
Layer and reassembled at the receiving end.   
The Application Layer data unit header, as seen in Figure 30, is either 2 or 4 bytes 
long, depending on whether the message is sent as a request or a response.  The 
Application Control field is primarily used for flow control, while the Function Code 
field defines the function that must be performed.  A request message will offer eight 
types of functions: transfer (confirm, read or write), control, freeze, application control, 
configuration, or time synchronization).  A response message offers three: confirm, read, 
or write.  Clark and Reynders describe the functions available. [26]  The Internal 





Figure 30 A simplified breakdown of the DNP3 message format, showing 
encapsulation and assembly across layers. 
The data in the Application layer consists of one or more Data Units.  There are a 
wide variety of Data Units available with header sizes ranging from three to eleven bytes.  
Clark and Reynders describe many of the message formats available. [26] 
 
3. HDLC 
High Level Data Link Control (HDLC) is a link layer protocol defined by the 
International Standards Organization (ISO) for point-to-point and multi-point links.  It is 
a predecessor to the modern Ethernet protocol.  HDLC operates either in unbalanced 
response mode (NRM) for environments where a master station initiates all transactions, 
and Asynchronous balanced mode (ABM) for environments where any node can initiate a 








Start of Frame Delimiter
Frame Header
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Figure 31 High Level Data Link Control Frame Structure.  The Control field is used to 
determine which class of message is being used. 
HDLC offers three classes of frames: unnumbered, information, and supervisory.  
Unnumbered frames are used for establishing the link or connection, and to define which 
mode (NRM or ABM) is used.  Information frames are used to convey data from one 
node to another.  Supervisory frames are used for flow and error control, and to provide 
acknowledgement or request re-transmission.  Clark and Reynders describe the protocol 
operation and the error and flow control functions. [27] 
4. MODBUS 
Modbus is a slow, yet widely accepted, protocol for process control systems.  It 
defines no interface, so almost any transmission path is suitable for the slow speeds with 
which Modbus operates.  Modbus operates on the Master/Slave principle, allowing for up 
to 247 slaves per master.  Only masters initiate transactions, and a broadcast capability is 
defined when no responses from the slaves are required.  A timeout function ensures that 
if the master does not receive a response to the query, it can resend its query.  Data can be 
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sent in either ASCII or hex formats, with the hex format (often called Modbus-B for 
Binary) offering increased speed and reduced size of messages.  Modbus offers error 
checking via character framing, a parity check and a Cyclic Redundancy Check (CRC). 
Modbus offers seven functions: 
• Coil (digital bits that can be read and written to) control commands for 
reading and writing a single coil or group of coils 
• Input (digital bits that can be read) control commands for reading input 
status of a group of inputs 
• Register (16 bit integers that can be read and written to) control commands 
for reading and writing one or more holding registers 
• Diagnostic tests and reports 
• Program functions 
• Polling control functions 
• Reset [28] 
The format of a Modbus frame is shown in Figure 32.  .  Clark and Reynders 










Figure 32 The Modbus frame format. 
 
5. PROFIBUS 
The Profibus protocol is based on a token bus/floating master system.  The three 
types of Profibus are: 
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• Fieldbus Message Specification (FMS) is used for general data acquisition 
systems.  At the physical layer, FMS requires the EIA-485 voltage 
standard for transmission speeds up to 187.5 Kbps.. 
• Decentralized Peripherals (DP) for use when fast communication is 
required.  At the physical layer, DP requires the EIA-485 voltage standard 
for transmission speeds up to 12 Mbps. 
• Process Automation (PA) for use when highly reliable and safe 
communication is required. At the physical layer, PA requires the IEC 
1158-2 voltage standard for transmission speeds up to 31.25 Kbps. [29] 
The significant difference between FMS, DP and PA is at the physical layer, 
which allows all three versions of Profibus to be employed in one SCADA system due to 
the similarities at the application layer.  One application, for example, would be to use 
cheaper FMS devices in most field instrumentation devices, DP devices where speed is 
important, and PA devices where safety and reliability is required. 
At the data link layer, Profibus employs a hybrid token passing and master/slave 
operation.  A token is passed to all masters in a precisely defined time period and in a 
defined sequence, which allows the master with the token to read and write to slave 
devices. [29]   
 
6. FOUNDATION FIELDBUS 
Foundation Fieldbus uses IEC 1158-2 and ISA S50.02-1992 standards at the 
physical layer which allows for intrinsic safety options, bus power, and a standardized 
interface to the communications link (Physical layer as described in Figure 33).  
Foundation Fieldbus supports communications at 31.25 Kbps. 
Figure 33 shows the message formats of Foundation Fieldbus for each the layers 
defined in the standard.  The Data Link layer provides a scheduler called the Link Active 
Scheduler (LAS) that assigns permissions to devices for communicating based on a pre-
defined schedule; no device communicates without permission from the scheduler.  The 
LAS employs a "publisher/subscriber" model: when a device is permitted to transmit, , it 
broadcasts its message on the bus (publisher), and the recipient device reads the message 
into memory (subscriber); all other devices ignore the message. Details regarding the 
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Figure 33 The Foundation Fieldbus message format as it travels up the stack from the 
physical to the application layer. (After Ref [30]) 
 
7. UCA 
UCA is a relatively new standard employing an object-oriented approach with 
three primary goals: 
• A uniform communications infrastructure 
• A uniform application interface 
• A uniform data model [31] 
The three goals serve to provide vendor and platform independence, allowing 
disparate SCADA systems to integrate seamlessly.   
The uniform communications interface is based on three defined layers called the 
L, T and A-Profiles, corresponding roughly to the Physical/Data Link, 
Network/Transport, and Session/Presentation/Application layers, respectively, of the OSI 
model.  The modularity allows for almost any transmission medium and almost any 
network and transport standard.  [31] 
The uniform application interface is designed to allow manufacturers to design 
their devices using standard services models, in theory allowing any UCA-compliant 
device to be connected to any other UCA compliant device.  It defines components (with 
85 
appropriate interfaces) such as a Data Acquisition and Control (DAC) Client, DAC 
Server, and Data Repository. [31] 
The uniform data model defines an object model, through four levels of 
abstraction, which serves to standardize the approach to handling SCADA data.  Each 



























THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 
87 
APPENDIX B - LADDER LOGIC FOR SCADA TECHNOLOGY 
TESTING LABORATORY DEMONSTRATION MODEL 
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APPENDIX C - ROBOTIC ARM MOVEMENT COMMANDS 
To command the robot arm to move, a series of three bytes in the following 
format is sent to the robot arm through the SLC-5/05 RS-232 port: 
• Byte 1: sync marker (always 255) 
• Byte 2: Servo Number (between 0 and 254) In the NPS SCADA Lab, 
there are only 5 servos, so the appropriate range is 0-4: 
o Servo 0 controls the base 
o Servo 1 controls the shoulder 
o Servo 2 controls the elbow 
o Servo 3 controls the wrist 
o Servo 4 controls the pincers. 
• Byte 3: Position (between 0 and 254.  Position 0 is far left/up, position 254 
is far right/down, and position 127 is center.) 
The following sections describe the commands sent to the robot arm to perform 
the following sequence of actions: 
1. Reset the arm to the center 
2. Move from the center to the section indicated by "FROM"  
3. Grasp the barrel 
4. Move to the section indicated by "TO"  
5. Release the barrel 
6. Reposition at center 
The filename is the file read into the RSView32 Works application's memory at 
the time the appropriate button is pressed on the operator's console interface.  The 
RSView32 Works application then transmits the contents of the file, one line at a time, to 
the SLC-5/05 for further processing and transmission to the robotic arm. 
The first byte, since it always 255, is omitted from the text file and is 
automatically added by the SLC-5/05 ladder logic program.  The second byte (servo) is 
represented by the number in front of the comma, and the third byte (position) is 
represented by the number after the comma.   
1. FROM: A  TO: C 
The file "Box_A_C_01.txt" provides the commands for the robot arm to move the 






























2. FROM: B TO: A 
The file "Box_B_A_01.txt" provides the commands for the robot arm to move the 
































3. FROM: C TO: B 
The file "Box_C_B_01.txt" provides the commands for the robot arm to move the 
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